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Abstract
From colonial times well into the twentieth century (and, unfortunately, even beyond)
the man/land relationship in Latin America has been markedly unjust. Small numbers of
families have owned large tracts of the best land, while large numbers of poor families
have struggled with tiny plots of marginal land or labored on the estates of the rich. Chile
was no exception to this pattern. Thus, its experiment with land reform in the 1960s and
1970s, the setback of reform under the military in the 1970s and 1980s, and the resumption
of reform under democrats in the 1990s, may provide lessons for the rest of Latin
America. Is a preferential option for the rural poor still possible in a neoliberal economic
system? In Chile, the answer is a qualified “yes.”
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Resumo
Desde o período colonial até o século 20 (e infelizmente mesmo depois disso), a relação
homem/terra na América Latina tem sido marcadamente injusta. Um pequeno número
de famílias concentrou grandes porções das melhores terras, enquanto um grande núme-
ro de famílias pobres lutava para sobreviver em pequenas parcelas de terras inférteis ou
trabalhando nas grandes propriedades dos ricos. O Chile não foi uma exceção a este
padrão de distribuição da terra. Deste modo, o experimento com reforma agrária nos
anos e 70, e o retrocesso durante o governo militar nos anos 70 e 80, bem como a
retomada da reforma agrária sob os governos democráticos dos anos 90, oferecem lições
para o resto da América Latina. A opção preferencial pelos pobres do campo é ainda
possível dentro de um sistema econômico neoliberal? No caso do Chile, a resposta é um
“sim” com restrições.
Palavras-chave:  reforma agraria, opção preferencial pelos pobres do campo, Chile.
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Background
Up until the 1960s, Chile had one of the worst man/land
distributions in Latin America. At that time, according to Marion
R. Brown of the Land Tenure Center at the University of
Wisconsin, 2 percent of the farms in Chile controlled 70 percent
of the land, while 42 percent of the irrigable land in Chile’s
Central Valley was in natural (unimproved) pasture (Brown,
1989, p. 221). Another figure cited by Cristobal Kay is that
minifundistas (small peasant landowners, accounted for 37
percent of the farms, but only 1 percent of the arable land, while
latifundistas (large landed estate owners) with only 7 percent
of the farms owned 65 percent of arable land in 1955 (Kay,
2002, pp. 466-467). Most rural families were either landless
inquilinos, resident serfs on the estates, or minifundistas,
engaged in barely self-sufficient plots on the margins. Yields for
the principal grain and meat crops were low, and farming was
not considered as important as having a fine house, stables,
and subservient workforce in the country with which to
entertain one’s friends and extended family. This feudal
orientation cost Chile over $100 million each year in unneeded
food imports (Feinberg, 1972, p. 60).
Surprisingly, a new generation of elites, many the offspring
of landed families, with agricultural training and experience
began to seek an end to this largely feudal system. In the 1960s,
Pope John XXIII, John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, and
Fidel Castro had each championed the need for land reform.
Bishops turned over Church lands to resident workers in the
Santiago and Talca areas in 1963-64, and the conservative
government of Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) put a land reform
bill on the books, one that was directed more at colonization
(i.e., opening new lands) than redistribution. While Alessandri
contented himself with a very minimal application of the law,
the Kennedy Administration judged that it met criteria for
development assistance and included Chile in the Alliance
program.
Whether dividing or colonizing the land, agrarian reform
is, and has to be, more than just land reform. Those who receive
(and are expected to pay for) their new property are also in
need of credits, extension services, infrastructural investments,
and, if organized into cooperatives, management training. But
getting to this point is not easy. The rural sociologist and Jesuit
priest Gonzalo Arroyo was one of the strongest advocates of
land, and agrarian, reform. But, as he wrote in 1964, “agrarian
reform, without any doubt, is a complex process. It involves the
play of passions, of interests, and often the egoisms of the groups
involved, such that one can never exactly predict the course
that the reform will take” (Arroyo, 1964, p. 7).
In the 1964 election campaign, both the Christian
Democrat candidate, Eduardo Frei, and the Socialist candidate,
Salvador Allende, promised vigorous action on land reform. Frei’s
landslide victory looked as if he had a clear mandate for social
reform. But he soon encountered opposition from his own
supporters. In fact, there had been no real mandate. Frei had
defeated Allende with the tactical help of the country’s
conservative parties. Trying to break through the political
isolation of the inquilinos, he legalized peasant unionization
and even sent organizers into the countryside to assist their
mobilization. The Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario
(Agricultural Development Institute, INDAP), set up by
Alessandri, was nominally intended to serve the interests of
small farmers. Frei now put Jacques Chonchol, an internationally
experienced agricultural engineer, in charge. Then, in 1967,
over the furious opposition of big landowners, the Chilean
Congress approved a land reform bill that authorized the breakup
of all estates over 80 irrigated hectares (roughly 200 acres).
Resident workers (inquilinos) were the main recipients,
generally receiving 20 hectares per family from the new
Corporación de la Reforma Agraria (CORA). Agronomists were
hired to oversee the process, including the determination of
payments by recipients and compensation to the expropriated
owners. As compensation was in long-term bonds, to be paid
out over 30 years, the affected landowners cried “confiscation.”
The bill, however, did permit owners to retain reservas, up to 80
irrigated hectares of core lands including homes and other
buildings. The more opportunistic owners broke their holdings
into 80 hectare units, parceling them out to family members.
Still, as John Gunther pointed out at the time, Frei had a lot of
trouble passing his land bill because “practically all Conservative
and Liberal members of congress, half the Radicals, and, more
important, some fifty out of his own Christian Democrats, are
landowners” (Gunther, 1967, p. 351). Brian Loveman reports
that Chonchol
believed it necessary to go beyond the bounds of existing
law in the unionization of rural labor and in support for
agrarian reform. […] [He] promoted large numbers of
agricultural labor conflicts and organized multiform unions
in direct violation of existing legislation. Not to be outdone,
Communist and Socialist organizers competed with INDAP
in the effort to mobilize the rural labor force against the
landowners and to accelerate agrarian reform (Loveman,
2001, p. 242).
CORA found itself slowed down by financial, logistical,
and political restraints. In three years of land reform, the Frei
Administration was only able to redistribute 1,319 properties,
totaling 3.4 million hectares, the lands going to 28,000 families
– far fewer than President Frei’s target of 100,000 (Chonchol,
1994, p. 293). In the meantime, 400 peasant unions were
organized with 100,000 members, heightening pressures for
further land reform.
Despite the breakthrough in land reform, this performance
was criticized by the Socialist and Communist opposition in
Congress who felt that it did not go far enough. This feeling was
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shared by a faction of President Frei’s own Christian Democratic
Party, especially its younger members and those directly involved
in the agrarian reform program, including Chonchol himself. In
an attempt to aid Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic
candidate in the 1970 presidential elections, PDC Senator
Patricio Aylwin got a bill passed that streamlined the
expropriation process, meeting many of the criticisms of the
left. But ironically, Tomic came in third in the 1970 election
behind the conservative, Jorge Alessandri, running for a second
term, and Salvador Allende, representing the Unidad Popular
(UP), a coalition of the Socialists, Communists, and MAPU (a
new party of Christian Democratic dissidents). Allende narrowly
won, and, although the UP did not get a majority of seats in the
Congress, that body nevertheless ratified Allende’s victory by a
large majority.
From Allende to Pinochet
While Chilean politics in the twentieth century has
usually been ideologically polarized, it had somehow managed
to keep a fairly civilized character. Arturo Valenzuela criticizes
the PDC’s “revolution in liberty” as an inflexible departure
from the traditional coalition politics of the past (Valenzuela,
1999, p. 218). But now, under Allende, it was the Socialists
who were inflexible. The United States played no small role in
this. After John Kennedy’s assassination, interest in Latin
American socio-economic reform began to wane, while anti-
Communism, always important, took center-stage,
exacerbating Chile’s polarization. Well-documented efforts by
the U.S. to influence the 1970 election – both in the campaign
and in the Congressional ratification – may have emboldened
Chilean conservatives to dig in their heels. American fury at
the expropriations of American copper and other companies
in 1971-72 triggered new covert efforts to fund Allende’s
enemies and to strangle Chile economically (Oppenheim,
1999, p. 101-102).
Allende’s goal was a socialist society, generating equity
and development for all. His government set out as rapidly as
possible to achieve a set of reforms that would be irreversible.
The problem with this was that the legally authorized
takeovers of property – urban or rural – were accompanied by
a number of seizures (tomas) that were outside the law. Most
of these were carried out by radical groups – workers, youths,
and Mapuche Indians – most from within Allende’s own
Socialist Party and the smaller Leftist Revolutionary Movement
(Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario, MIR). The tomas
particularly alarmed the Unidad Popular’s other leaders from
the Communist Party and the MAPU who feared a civil war
and reversal of reform.
President Allende appointed Jacques Chonchol (now
one of the MAPU leaders) as Minister of Agriculture. Using the
Aylwin procedures, Allende was able to expropriate 4,490
properties, encompassing 6.6 million hectares, and benefiting
75,000 families. In effect, this put an end to the latifundio system
in Chile. But at times, the pace of land reform was dizzying to
everyone. One CORA agent reportedly oversaw the takeover of
thirty farms a month, a pace far beyond CORA’s ability to issue
titles and provide adequate evaluation. In fact, 1,700
expropriations took the form of tomas, or seizures, by campesinos
themselves. Brian Loveman (2001, p. 251) argues that many of
these were legitimized by Allende under a “right of intervention”
in the event of a work stoppage.
As protests against the land redistributions grew, President
Allende removed Chonchol as Minister of Agriculture on
November 2, 1972, and brought the Armed Forces commander,
General Carlos Prats, into his cabinet as Minister of the Interior.
It was hoped that the military and state police (carabineros)
might bring the tomas to a halt and restore due process to the
reforms. It was not enough. Throughout the Spring of 1973,
truckers went on strike, blocking food deliveries to the cities.
Women banging pots and pans demonstrated at the shortages
and rising prices. PDC leadership, seeing its possible advantage
in the crisis, began to conspire with the military to up-end the
regime. By September 1973, it came to an end. General Prats
had been replaced in August by his second-in-command, Ge-
neral Augusto Pinochet. Professing loyalty to Allende and calling
on the military to focus on economic issues, Pinochet quickly
took charge of the growing military/PDC conspiracy and
surprised his boss with a well orchestrated, but deadly, coup on
September 11, 1973.
In the furious counterrevolution that followed, the young
agronomists, and thousands more, were rounded up or fled the
country. Thousands were tortured and disappeared – from both
the radical (Socialists and MIRistas) and more moderate sectors
of UP (Communists and MAPU). General Prats, seen as too
loyal to Allende, went into exile in Argentina only to be
assassinated there by fellow military operatives in the DINA,
Pinochet’s secret police.
Socialism, and anything that looked like it, was now at an
end. Companies that had been seized by workers were returned
to their earlier owners. Gradually, under the influence of the
orthodox economic theories of the University of Chicago, now
called “neoliberalism,” the Chilean dictatorship cut the budget,
opened doors to trade and investment, and reduced government
involvement in economic matters. Ironically, the most lucrative
part of the economy, the copper industry, which had been
expropriated by Allende, remained in government hands.
Equally curious was the government’s attitude towards the
land reform.2
2 Cristobal Kay (2002, p. 470-474) traces the changes, and sometimes paradoxical decisions, in the Pinochet regime towards agricultural development.
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What happened to the land reform?
If Pinochet brutally ushered in an era of conservative,
authoritarian government, the agrarian reforms – at least some
of them – survived. Rather than hand back lands expropriated
by the Frei government to their former owners, the Pinochet
government allowed many of the new peasant owners to hold
on to their property. This even included some of the lands taken
under the Allende/Chonchol regime where the transfer had
been handled properly under the agrarian reform law. Lands
taken in tomas and those tied up in court appeals generally
were returned to their original owners. “Of the land originally
expropriated, 57 percent (in terms of productive value) remained
in the reform sector under cooperative or individual
management, 28 percent was returned to previous owners, 5
percent was auctioned, and 10 percent was retained in the
public sector, mainly for forestation and subsequent private sale”
(Jarvis, 1992, p. 192). After all was said and done, some 45,000
peasant families remained beneficiaries, holding an average of
eight BIH. Properties over 80 BIH, which had taken up 55.3
percent of lands and had fallen to 2.9 percent between 1965
and 1972, rose to 24.7 in 1976, while holdings below 20 BIH
went from 22 percent in 1965 to 47 percent in 1976. Shifts
were under way in the philosophy of production, and the bias of
the Pinochet regime was not so much anti-peasant as it was
anti-wastefulness in agriculture (Kay, 2002, p. 467, 473).
Consistent with the Pinochet regime’s free market
philosophy, cooperative holdings (asentamientos) were viewed
as socialistic. Most were broken up, and peasant members
(parceleros) were given individual titles. But as many as 28,000
sold their properties, 10% to other peasants, 50% to larger
farmers, and 30% to others3. A new constitution in 1980 made
the rights to property (land and water) inviolable and removed
more liberal language guaranteeing the “social function” of
property (i.e., in which land and water were obliged to serve
the common good). Although CORA remained in existence
until 1979 to administer these changes, its staff was sharply
reduced from 4,622 in 1973 to 1,452 in 1977 (Garrido, 1988,
p. 225). INDAP’s personnel and budget were also cut back,
depriving peasants of credit, extension services, and otherwise
“smothering the parceleros in their debts,” as several informants
put it. The effect of this, as noted above, was to force many of
the small, new landowners into selling their lands, reverting to
a dependent life of farm labor, or migrating to Santiago. A study
by Jorge Echenique suggests that only a third of the parceleros
were ultimately able to ride out this difficult period and retain
their land4. Meanwhile a vigorous land market developed that
diversified ownership in the countryside.
Pinochet supporters like to credit the sharp rise in
agricultural productivity to this land market and to policies of
economic neoliberalism. A chief ingredient in this growth has
been the development of nontraditional agricultural exports
(NTAE): fruits, vegetables, wine, flowers, etc. But I think it is
only fair to point to the earlier work of INDAP and the Corporation
for the Development of Production (CORFO), which used the
pressures of the agrarian reform to stimulate greater
innovativeness and productivity on what soon would become
smaller farms. Families that had tried to avoid expropriation by
breaking up their estates may have inadvertently furthered this
new decision-making by facilitating a transfer of power away
from traditional hands. NTAE was also stimulated by early
attempts (in the 1960s) at Latin American economic integration
as well as various exchange agreements with the United States
(e.g., Chile-California Sister State Program). The winter/summer
complementarity of foodstuffs from the northern and southern
hemispheres presented Chile with a virtual open door to markets
in Europe, the U.S., and Asia. This reorientation of agriculture
was already under way when the coup struck. But in the
seventeen years of military rule it was given further support as
an export-generating part of the government’s neoliberal
economic policies. NTAE production has remained a central
part of the succeeding democratic governments.
INDAP’S agrarian reform
But here is the interesting switch. Despite the
conservative bias of neoliberalism, and the promises that
democratic governments have made to the domestic and
international business communities, concern about the rural
poor has been increased. As stated earlier, agrarian reform, to be
successful, has to include not only land reform (i.e., redistribution
and/or colonization) but also broad agricultural extension
services, credits, infrastructural improvements, marketing
assistance, etc.
Can you carry out agrarian reform without land reform?
There is still a great deal of minifundia in Chile – peasants with
under 12 hectares of land in the Central Valley, and still others
are landless laborers or hold only tiny parcels of parched soil in
the coastal and Andean foothills. Bold plans for irrigation may
bring new life to barren lands, while carefully integrated credits
and extension services may raise incomes for all groups.
Agriculture, both traditional and nontraditional, is
centered on the so-called Central Valley of Chile – actually a
series of valley bottoms along Andean rivers to the sea, from La
Serena in the north to Puerto Montt in the south. Bouncing
back from the severe cutbacks inflicted by the Pinochet regime,
3 Sergio Gomez y Jorge Echenique, 1988, La agricultura chilena: las dos caras de la modernizacion, Santiago, FLACSO/AGRARIA (in Doren and Leiva, 1999).
4 Jorge Echenique, interview, Santiago, May 2000; see also Echenique and Rolando (1991).
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INDAP sharply increased its credits and services. With 12
irrigated hectares, or their equivalent, as the maximum
qualification for assistance, those engaged in peasant family
agriculture (agricultura familiar campesina) could now qualify
for a whole range of INDAP credits and services – irrigation,
road construction, managerial training, product development,
and, of greatest immediate importance, the rescheduling of debts
and legalized title (for as many as 100,000 property holders)
(Kay and Silva, 1992, p. 297).
Getting up to speed is not easy, and there are some
catches. Technical and managerial assistance are only provided
by outsiders – paid consultants. INDAP recommends them,
but they are selected in a way that gives the farmer (or
cooperative) equal say. On our travels throughout Chile, we did
not hear any complaint about this commercialization of the
assistance process. Switching to nontraditional agricultural
products for export is also an expensive proposition – up to
$10,000 per hectare for the initial investment in fruits and/or
flowers, for example. But throughout the Central Valley, the
countryside is filled with small fields of peaches, apples, pears,
papayas, kiwi, berries, and grapes. Many small grain and
livestock producers have made the switch to NTAE, partly
induced by the (free market) competition from Argentina and
subsidized exports from the U.S.A.
Part of the way small farmers are coping with size is
through contracts with agroindustry. With the help of large
food processing companies, peasant coops are finding better
markets for their produce. A good example of this is pisco, the
strong brandy that goes into pisco sours, the national drink. The
Capel pisco distillery is a cooperatively owned industry which
processes the muscatel produced by its members. Concha y
Toro, the wine giant, buys the whole crops of local growers.
Thus, the vast estate of the past is replaced by a well capitalized
food processor part of whose raw material is provided by small
farmers, working their own land. Jorge Echenique, an agrarian
reform consultant, is hopeful that the Programa de Desarrollo
de Provedores (Program to Develop Suppliers) will be expanded
to get all food-processing agroindustries to buy their supplies
from small farmers in a 50 kilometer radius around them. For
this the government would offer the agroindustries a subsidy.
Even short of such a cumbersome partnership,
minifundistas are forging productive cooperatives with the help
of INDAP. In Coltauco, Region VI, we visited a 60-member onion
and garlic cooperative which had recently built a large
warehouse, financed by credits from INDAP. The government
marketing organization, ProChile, was helping them to find
foreign markets. In Curico, a grape-growing coop was in the
process of setting up a winery. We also visited a large warehouse
and freezer for raspberries in Curico. There were as many hired
workers, sorting and handling, as there were coop members. In
Donihue, we visited a flower coop, supervised and assisted by
the local INDAP office [there are 102 local offices throughout
Chile, and main offices in each of the thirteen regions]. In Victoria
we watched Mapuche farmers lined up to obtain seed money
at the start of the wheat-growing season; and in Triguen we
heard of a group of young Mapuches who had encouraged their
elders to grow chicharo (garbanzo) beans, which are popular in
Spain. With help from INDAP, they became a recognized coop,
and with aid from the national marketing agency ProChile they
could enter the Spanish market.
In 2002, the number of families eligible for such
assistance was 278,000 (or 1.2 million persons). Some 27.9
billion pesos (roughly $68 million) were provided in direct
credits, and another 47.2 billion ($115 million) in training and
investment incentives (incentivos a la inversion y desarrollo de
capacidades). INDAP invested $125 million in new irrigation
projects over the decade, increasing watered land by 77,000
hectares and recuperating some 413,000 hectares of degraded
soil. Finally, INDAP reported that of the 330 billion pesos ($800
million) loaned out between 1994 and 2002, approximately
98% had been paid back, making the loan stock fully self-
sustaining (Caffena, 2003).
Land reform is not on the horizon for the poor farmers of
Chile any more. Works of irrigation may expand agricultural
lands somewhat for small farmers – especially those owning
land in the marginal areas of the coast and Andean foothills.
President Lagos (2000-2005) gave his support to these
developments, and INDAP’s budget received increased funding
from Congress. The only cloud hanging over the “redemption”
of the campesinos is the vulnerability of NTAE exports to changing
world markets. As is well known, the terms of trade for raw
materials and even the first-stage processing thereof are generally
negative for the producer. The “market basket” of manufactured
goods from the First World costs more and more each year for
the producer of food and other raw materials. While Chile has a
comparative advantage of sorts, given the summer/winter
complementarity of markets, north and south, she must compe-
te with other southern food producers (South Africa, Argentina,
and Australasia). While the market in the north is extensive,
economic reversals in Japan, Europe, or North America can
have a devastating effect in this trade. “But what else can we
do?” we were asked. The government’s response to this question
has been to show a preferential option to the rural poor. As Kay
argues forcefully, “No process of modernization and
democratization can be complete unless the country has tackled,
if not fully resolved, the outstanding agrarian question” (Kay,
2002, p. 494). What INDAP has done, and is doing, seems to
provide a very healthy start.
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